Before I say anything about the role of moralism in Objectivism, allow me to define my terms. By moralism, I mean something very different from morality. The Oxford English Dictionary's first definition of the world moralism is, "The practice of moralizing?." Naturally, our next question is, what is meant by "moralizing?" The OED's first definition of the word moralize, in the intransitive sense, is "To indulge in moral discussion." This doesn't tell us a whole lot, but the word indulge does point us in the right direction. To indulge in moral discussion suggests that there is something gratifying and yet destructive, if done in excess, about this moral discussion-just as there is something gratifying and yet destructive, if done in excess, about indulging yourself in decadent desserts. This is approximately what I mean when I use the terms moralism and moralization. However, I'm going to go even further to make the radical claim that moralism is always destructive and that any moralism is excessive.

As a parallel, consider the relationship between rationality, rationalism, and rationalization. Rationalism and rationalization superficially resemble rationality in that they employ the language of logic, but in reality, rationalism and rationalization are mere facades that hide the emotional drive behind them. When I am accused of being rationalistic or rationalizing when I insist that I just didn't have time to go to the gym this week, I am being accused of pretending to be rational while really being driven by emotions (in this case, I was driven by laziness). The same applies to moralism and moralization. Moralism and moralization appear to be rationally justified by morality, but-I will argue-they are actually driven by underlying emotions.

So what do I mean by moralization? I mean self-righteous vituperation masquerading as a justified expression of moral judgment. (Vituperation, by the way, is "the use of violent abuse or extremely harsh criticism.") Again, by moralization I mean self-righteous vituperation masquerading as a justified expression of moral judgment. My point is this: there is an element of indignation in moralistic judgment, whether towards others or towards oneself. As I will argue later, however, this indignation or self-righteous vituperation is not necessitated by moral judgment and neither is it justified, healthy, or useful.