Now that I've defined my terms, allow me to continue to compare and contrast rationalization and moralization, this time looking at these phenomena from a psychoanalytic perspective. From a psychoanalytic perspective, rationalization and moralization are both defense mechanisms. I'm sure you've heard of this concept, defense mechanisms, originated by none other that Sigmund Freud. Other common defenses include repression, projection, denial, intellectualization, and sublimation. In fact, there are dozens of defense mechanisms. We inadvertently employ these defense mechanisms to avoid facing contents of our unconscious that we, at some level, don't want to face. For example, if I don't want to face the fact that I succumbed to a weakness of character by not going to the gym this week, I may deny the weakness and come up with what I think is a rational explanation for my behavior without realizing what I'm doing or why. Now back to the relationship between rationalization and moralization: In a foundational textbook on psychoanalysis today called Psychoanalytic Diagnosis, Dr. Nancy McWilliams writes the following:

When one is rationalizing, one unconsciously seeks cognitively acceptable grounds for one's direction; when one is moralizing, one seeks ways to feel it is one's duty to pursue that course. Rationalization converts what the person already wants into reasonable language; moralization puts it into the realm of the justified or morally obligatory?. The self-righteous quality of [moralization] makes others regard it as either amusing or vaguely unpleasant, although in certain social and political situations, leaders who exploit their constituents' wish to feel morally superior can produce mass moralization so effortlessly that the public that has been thus seduced hardly blinks (125).

In this dense passage, McWilliams makes a number of points about moralization: First, she points out that moralization makes us feel that what we are doing is right, which often means feeling that those with whom we disagree are wrong. Note the centrality of emotion in this formulation. Second, she has something to say about the social effects of moralization: On the one hand, the self-righteousness of this defense mechanism tends to either put people off or make them laugh, but not convince them of anything. In other words, if I go up to a anarcho-capitalist libertarian and say, "You are an evil evader! You should embrace Objectivism if you want to be a moral person rather than a subjectivistic whim-worshipper!", he is more likely to snicker or give me the cold shoulder than thank me for the sound advice and pick up a copy of Atlas Shrugged. On the other hand, moralism does have some power when it comes to an organization. If Leonard Peikoff were to tell me what a morally superior person I am because I work so hard to practice the Objectivist virtues, I might lap it right up and ask him how I can help him to fight the good fight.