Thus, I will introduce two new concepts to distinguish the two different types of vernacular/psychological altruism. The first type is affective altruism, which is defined as behavior that is intended to help another as a direct means to the ultimate end of one's own emotional gratification. While the intention of helping another must be conscious, the knowledge that one's ultimate end is one's own emotional gratification need not be conscious. The second type is cognitive altruism, which is defined as behavior that one believes to be intended to help another as a means to the ultimate end of promoting the other's welfare. Here both the intention of helping and the believed ultimate end of promoting the other's welfare must be conscious. Clearly, affective altruism does not imply cognitive altruism. For example, if I help an old lady to cross the street for the explicit purpose of making myself feel good, this is affectively altruistic but not cognitively altruistic. Also, cognitive altruism does not necessarily imply affective altruism. For example, if I help an old lady to cross the street because I think it is right to help other people but doing so doesn't actually make me feel good, this is cognitively altruistic but not affectively altruistic. Of course, it is possible for a behavior to be both affectively and cognitively altruistic.

For example, if I tell myself that I am helping an old lady cross the street because it is right to help other people but I am really doing so because helping her directly makes me happy, this is both affectively and cognitively altruistic.

For the purpose of this thesis, I am concerned primarily with affective altruism. For altruistic behavior that is reflex-like and non-volitional - as is the case with altruism that is evolutionary but not affective or cognitive - no ethical question can be asked, for an ethical question, by its nature, presupposes volition. Between affective altruism and cognitive altruism, the former is a much better candidate for being part of human nature. Kant (1785/1993) argues that we should follow the categorical imperative (which implies that we should behave cognitively altruistically) not because it is in our nature to do so, but in spite of the fact that it is not in our nature to do so. Social norms advocate cognitive altruism and consider affective altruism, at best, neutral and, at worst, disingenuous. Thus, it is more likely that cognitive altruism than affective altruism is a product of social construction rather than human nature, and therefore, it is on affective altruism that I will focus.