The reader may wonder why I have chosen to focus on benevolence rather than altruism. I did so because altruism is defined differently by biologists, psychologists, and philosophers, and since this thesis may be read by members of any of the three groups, to use the term altruism would be ambiguous, confusing, and possibly misleading. Biologists tend to define altruism purely in terms of behavior: behavior that causes a cost to the self and a benefit to another (e.g., Dawkins, 1976; Trivers, 1971; Wilson, 1975). Psychologists tend to add an intentional component: behavior that causes a cost to the self and is intended to cause a benefit to another without external motivation, as to receive material or social rewards (e.g., Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989; Staub, 1978; Cialdini et al., 1981). Philosophers tend to add a motivational conponent: behavior that causes a cost to the self, is intended to cause a benefit to another, and is motivated by concern for the beneficiary and not with the self. [REFS] Some psychologists, such as Batson (1991), also define altruism with this motivational component. The best definition to use to answer the questions I have posed is the second, which specifies the intention but not the motivation. The reason for this is that to determine how I should behave and how the government should regulate behavior, intentions matter and I do not want to limit types of motivation. Intentions matter because whether I should behave a certain way and whether the government should regulate such behavior depend on the behavior's underlying intention. For example, the ethical and political analysis of giving would be entirely different if the behavior in question were accidentally dropping wallets on the street, giving one's money when one is robbed at gunpoint, or voluntarily giving money to charity to pay for food and shelter for homeless people. Motivation also matters for ethical and political questions, but determining the motivation that underlies benevolent behavior is a very complex, controversial topic (e.g., Batson, 1991; Cialdini et al., 1987) that is outside the scope of this thesis. Rather, I will leave motivation completely unrestricted, so as not to exclude intentionally helpful behavior that is egoistically motivated. In fact, with regard to the ethical question I have posed, I am particularly concerned with egoistically motivated helping because I am specifically analyzing the contribution of helping to one's own happiness. To avert the many possible confusions and misinterpretations that could arise if I use the word "altruism," I stipulate the following: Henceforth, when I use the word "benevolence," I will be referring to the intentional, non-motivational definition of altruism. [REFS SHOWING HOW SOME PHILOSOPHERS USE "BENEVOLENCE"] Also to avoid ambiguity, when I refer to the non-intentional, non-motivational type of altruism, I will use the phrase, "evolutionary altruism" (Sober & Wilson, 1998) to indicate that I refer to the biologist's definition of altruism. [CHANGE ALL REFERENCES TO "BIOLOGICAL ALTRUISM" TO "EVOLUTIONARY ALTRUISM"]